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| Copyright © 2006 - 2011 - Barry M. Baker - CareerPoliceOfficer.com |
| Disclaimer |
| CareerPoliceOfficer.com is not responsible for the contents of any linked site or any link contained in a linked site, or any changes or updates to such sites. Links are provided only as a convenience, and the inclusion of any link does not imply endorsement by this site. |
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| SEAL Teams |
Do We Need More Than the SEALs?
by Thomas B. Hunter
by Thomas B. Hunter
Raising the question as to whether or not the United States military
needs the SEAL teams is, at the very least, bound to raise a few
eyebrows. Yet, when one examines the question with a
dispassionate eye, the answers are not so clear-cut. In fact, careful
consideration of the idea requires an equally careful solution. In the
final analysis, it may be that the future of the SEALs lies not with the
Navy, but with a carefully thought-out integration with other special
operations forces (SOF).
This is not to say that the Navy should have no role in special
warfare; quite the contrary. In fact, the Naval Special Warfare
Command plays a critical role in this equation. The Navy’s Special
Boat Units (SBU) along with their attendant Mobile Support Teams
(MST) provide an experienced, highly trained cadre capable of
operating a number of specialized platforms (e.g. Mark V Special
Operations Craft, NSW Rigid Inflatable Boats, Special Operations
Craft -Riverine) ideal for the overt or clandestine maritime insertion
of special operations teams. Additionally, the Navy’s other unique
special warfare platform, the Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV) units,
offer a proven and important capability for clandestine maritime
insertions.
Yet, despite arguments to the contrary, the maritime environment as
it pertains to special operations largely boils down to one of a
number of routes of entry into an operational area requiring a
specific type and method of transportation. Other methods include
air (i.e., air assault, airborne) and land (i.e., foot patrol, vehicle).
There is little tactical mystery to the techniques involved, save some
small variations, particularly given the fact that dozens of nations
have long maintained similar capabilities within their own SOF units.
It is obvious that the SEAL teams provide no small measure of pride,
mystique, and even awe among the general public and within the
services. That the SEALs have been the subject of popular
Hollywood films, best-selling books, television documentaries, and
innumerable magazine articles has done nothing but increase the
prestige associated with this famed unit. From a recruiting
perspective, it is natural that the Navy would want to retain the
SEALs on this basis alone.
There is also no question that the SEAL team operators are
amongst the most skilled and highly trained special operations
personnel in the maritime domain. However, the reality is that
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown the future of special
operations to be not in the water, but on land. The vast majority of
SEAL operations have taken place not in seas, oceans, or bays, but
in the mountains and caves of Afghanistan and in the streets of
towns and cities in Iraq. Clearly, while the ability to insert and extract
from the sea is a skill that must be maintained, it is not an oft-
practiced real-world mission.
Should the Navy require littoral combat mission, such as beach
reconnaissance, the U.S. Marines Corp reconnaissance teams are,
and have proven, more than capable of filling this role. This, in fact,
is USMC reconnaissance’s bread and butter. This does not require
the skill set of a SEAL whose true value, ostensibly, lies beyond the
surf zone.
So what then should become of the SEAL teams? One proposal that
merits consideration is combining existing SEAL teams into the U.S.
Army’s Special Forces Groups. These latter units maintain an
excellent maritime domain expertise derived, at least initially, via
attendance at the Army’s Combat Diver Course, Combat Dive
Supervisor Course, and other maritime training opportunities in the
U.S. and abroad. Yet, these personnel do not spend the majority of
their time in the water. Instead, this skill set is viewed (and
accurately so) as another method of clandestine entry into a target
location – a small piece of a much larger picture. Incorporating the
SEALs into the USSF would greatly enhance the U.S. military’s
special operations capabilities while retaining the specialized skills
developed by the teams over the last 45 years.
Another more radical proposal would be to establish a wholly new
U.S. Special Operations Force. This new command could train and
maintain a cadre of operators organized into teams by skill set, akin
to the British Special Air Service (SAS). In this form, the team is
broken down into four troops, each with a specialization in a specific
type of insertion and extraction (e.g. Air, Boat, Mobility [motorized
vehicles], and Mountain). SAS operators are not only cross-trained
in their specialty, but they spend a great deal of time learning and
developing skills that are requisite once a given team has inserted.
Clearly, this latter concept is a matter for discussion beyond the
scope of this article; however, it remains something that should be
considered by the military’s planners as we continue through this
era of limited war. At the time of the commissioning of the first SEAL
teams in 1962, there was a pressing and urgent need for special
operations forces capable of operating in a largely Riverine
environment (i.e. Vietnam). So too was there a need for this
capability to be numerically robust enough to conduct littoral
operations against the myriad potential targets that might arise in
the event of war with the Soviet Union.
Today, the U.S. does not face an overtly belligerent threat from any
major power. The Cold War ended, changing the landscape of
conflict from one of superpower versus superpower to one of
confrontation of terrorists, warlords, and insurgents. The maritime
landscape has long since changed from clandestine limpet mine
attacks against enemy warships in port to one of putting SEALs
ashore in hostile territory as merely the first phase of a longer
overland mission.
That said, the potential for conflicts with China or Russia also
demand that the U.S. retain sufficient special operations capability to
present a credible response to counter any potential or actual
aggression from larger military powers. Combining the teams with a
larger force as described above (in either scenario) would retain this
capability, while allowing the military to confront the unconventional
but quite real threats posed by terrorist, insurgents, and guerrillas.
In conclusion, it is accepted that the Navy’s SEAL teams are
exceptionally skilled and experienced in the maritime environment.
They include amongst their ranks some of the most highly trained
and capable maritime special operations personnel in the world. Yet,
it should also be recognized that, in today’s real-world conflicts,
maritime special warfare personnel are not called on to use this
specific and limited skill set, except in very rare occasions. Rather, it
is their expertise in traditional beyond-the-beach missions, such as
tracking down high value targets, nighttime raids on enemy
compounds, and commando-style assaults that are these units’
primary missions.
Any sober analysis of potential future conflicts reveals that these
sort of missions will remain at the top of the list for the unique talents
of America’s SOF. Thus, it is important that we consistently revisit
the function of the Navy SEAL teams and their future role within the
special operations community.
needs the SEAL teams is, at the very least, bound to raise a few
eyebrows. Yet, when one examines the question with a
dispassionate eye, the answers are not so clear-cut. In fact, careful
consideration of the idea requires an equally careful solution. In the
final analysis, it may be that the future of the SEALs lies not with the
Navy, but with a carefully thought-out integration with other special
operations forces (SOF).
This is not to say that the Navy should have no role in special
warfare; quite the contrary. In fact, the Naval Special Warfare
Command plays a critical role in this equation. The Navy’s Special
Boat Units (SBU) along with their attendant Mobile Support Teams
(MST) provide an experienced, highly trained cadre capable of
operating a number of specialized platforms (e.g. Mark V Special
Operations Craft, NSW Rigid Inflatable Boats, Special Operations
Craft -Riverine) ideal for the overt or clandestine maritime insertion
of special operations teams. Additionally, the Navy’s other unique
special warfare platform, the Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV) units,
offer a proven and important capability for clandestine maritime
insertions.
Yet, despite arguments to the contrary, the maritime environment as
it pertains to special operations largely boils down to one of a
number of routes of entry into an operational area requiring a
specific type and method of transportation. Other methods include
air (i.e., air assault, airborne) and land (i.e., foot patrol, vehicle).
There is little tactical mystery to the techniques involved, save some
small variations, particularly given the fact that dozens of nations
have long maintained similar capabilities within their own SOF units.
It is obvious that the SEAL teams provide no small measure of pride,
mystique, and even awe among the general public and within the
services. That the SEALs have been the subject of popular
Hollywood films, best-selling books, television documentaries, and
innumerable magazine articles has done nothing but increase the
prestige associated with this famed unit. From a recruiting
perspective, it is natural that the Navy would want to retain the
SEALs on this basis alone.
There is also no question that the SEAL team operators are
amongst the most skilled and highly trained special operations
personnel in the maritime domain. However, the reality is that
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown the future of special
operations to be not in the water, but on land. The vast majority of
SEAL operations have taken place not in seas, oceans, or bays, but
in the mountains and caves of Afghanistan and in the streets of
towns and cities in Iraq. Clearly, while the ability to insert and extract
from the sea is a skill that must be maintained, it is not an oft-
practiced real-world mission.
Should the Navy require littoral combat mission, such as beach
reconnaissance, the U.S. Marines Corp reconnaissance teams are,
and have proven, more than capable of filling this role. This, in fact,
is USMC reconnaissance’s bread and butter. This does not require
the skill set of a SEAL whose true value, ostensibly, lies beyond the
surf zone.
So what then should become of the SEAL teams? One proposal that
merits consideration is combining existing SEAL teams into the U.S.
Army’s Special Forces Groups. These latter units maintain an
excellent maritime domain expertise derived, at least initially, via
attendance at the Army’s Combat Diver Course, Combat Dive
Supervisor Course, and other maritime training opportunities in the
U.S. and abroad. Yet, these personnel do not spend the majority of
their time in the water. Instead, this skill set is viewed (and
accurately so) as another method of clandestine entry into a target
location – a small piece of a much larger picture. Incorporating the
SEALs into the USSF would greatly enhance the U.S. military’s
special operations capabilities while retaining the specialized skills
developed by the teams over the last 45 years.
Another more radical proposal would be to establish a wholly new
U.S. Special Operations Force. This new command could train and
maintain a cadre of operators organized into teams by skill set, akin
to the British Special Air Service (SAS). In this form, the team is
broken down into four troops, each with a specialization in a specific
type of insertion and extraction (e.g. Air, Boat, Mobility [motorized
vehicles], and Mountain). SAS operators are not only cross-trained
in their specialty, but they spend a great deal of time learning and
developing skills that are requisite once a given team has inserted.
Clearly, this latter concept is a matter for discussion beyond the
scope of this article; however, it remains something that should be
considered by the military’s planners as we continue through this
era of limited war. At the time of the commissioning of the first SEAL
teams in 1962, there was a pressing and urgent need for special
operations forces capable of operating in a largely Riverine
environment (i.e. Vietnam). So too was there a need for this
capability to be numerically robust enough to conduct littoral
operations against the myriad potential targets that might arise in
the event of war with the Soviet Union.
Today, the U.S. does not face an overtly belligerent threat from any
major power. The Cold War ended, changing the landscape of
conflict from one of superpower versus superpower to one of
confrontation of terrorists, warlords, and insurgents. The maritime
landscape has long since changed from clandestine limpet mine
attacks against enemy warships in port to one of putting SEALs
ashore in hostile territory as merely the first phase of a longer
overland mission.
That said, the potential for conflicts with China or Russia also
demand that the U.S. retain sufficient special operations capability to
present a credible response to counter any potential or actual
aggression from larger military powers. Combining the teams with a
larger force as described above (in either scenario) would retain this
capability, while allowing the military to confront the unconventional
but quite real threats posed by terrorist, insurgents, and guerrillas.
In conclusion, it is accepted that the Navy’s SEAL teams are
exceptionally skilled and experienced in the maritime environment.
They include amongst their ranks some of the most highly trained
and capable maritime special operations personnel in the world. Yet,
it should also be recognized that, in today’s real-world conflicts,
maritime special warfare personnel are not called on to use this
specific and limited skill set, except in very rare occasions. Rather, it
is their expertise in traditional beyond-the-beach missions, such as
tracking down high value targets, nighttime raids on enemy
compounds, and commando-style assaults that are these units’
primary missions.
Any sober analysis of potential future conflicts reveals that these
sort of missions will remain at the top of the list for the unique talents
of America’s SOF. Thus, it is important that we consistently revisit
the function of the Navy SEAL teams and their future role within the
special operations community.
About Thomas B. Hunter
Mr. Hunter served as an intelligence
officer with the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) from June 2002 to April
2007. During this time, he specialized
in a variety of analytical areas,
including Homeland Security,
Detainee Support, and South
American narcoterrorism. While
serving in the Weapons Branch, Mr.
Hunter specialized in the analysis of
terrorist tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP), which included in-
depth study of improvised explosive
devices and the TTP employed in
their use worldwide. He earned
numerous honors and awards
including citations from other
government agencies with whom he
consulted and coordinated hundreds
of finished intelligence papers.
Mr. Hunter has also written
extensively on numerous topics for
such publications as Jane’s
Intelligence Review, Jane’s
International Police Review, and U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings. In this
capacity, he has published over 100
articles on subjects ranging from
maritime piracy and special
operations to counterterrorism,
transnational crime, and other topics
pertaining to asymmetric threats and
responses. He has also served as
the editor of the Journal of
Counterterrorism and Security
International and the Special
Operations Journal.
Mr. Hunter holds a Masters Degree in
Unconventional Warfare from the
American Military University; a
Masters Degree in International
Security Studies from the University
of St. Andrews (Scotland); and an
undergraduate degree in English and
American Literature from the
University of Southern California. He
is currently an adjunct professor at
Henley-Putnam University.
Mr. Hunter served as an intelligence
officer with the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) from June 2002 to April
2007. During this time, he specialized
in a variety of analytical areas,
including Homeland Security,
Detainee Support, and South
American narcoterrorism. While
serving in the Weapons Branch, Mr.
Hunter specialized in the analysis of
terrorist tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP), which included in-
depth study of improvised explosive
devices and the TTP employed in
their use worldwide. He earned
numerous honors and awards
including citations from other
government agencies with whom he
consulted and coordinated hundreds
of finished intelligence papers.
Mr. Hunter has also written
extensively on numerous topics for
such publications as Jane’s
Intelligence Review, Jane’s
International Police Review, and U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings. In this
capacity, he has published over 100
articles on subjects ranging from
maritime piracy and special
operations to counterterrorism,
transnational crime, and other topics
pertaining to asymmetric threats and
responses. He has also served as
the editor of the Journal of
Counterterrorism and Security
International and the Special
Operations Journal.
Mr. Hunter holds a Masters Degree in
Unconventional Warfare from the
American Military University; a
Masters Degree in International
Security Studies from the University
of St. Andrews (Scotland); and an
undergraduate degree in English and
American Literature from the
University of Southern California. He
is currently an adjunct professor at
Henley-Putnam University.
Targeted Killing: Self-Defense,
Preemption, and the War on
Terrorism by Thomas Hunter
presents a reasoned, impeccably
researched, and multi-faceted
analysis of the tactic of targeted
killing assessing its role, efficacy, and
appropriateness in the current world
political and military climate. Target
killing is just one available option to
national governments in their varied
arsenals of state-sponsored
strategies and tactics for fighting
terrorism. Nevertheless, it is one of
the most controversial and logistically
dangerous options a government can
exercise in preemptive strikes against
real and current threats to national
security. Author Hunter skillfully
maneuvers through the moral,
military, political, and tactical issues
that can both cloud and clarify a
government’s implementation of state-
sponsored targeted killing. Written
with an expert and precise
understanding of the issue, Targeted
Killing offers an objective and
indispensable perspective on a
contentious and timely debate.
Preemption, and the War on
Terrorism by Thomas Hunter
presents a reasoned, impeccably
researched, and multi-faceted
analysis of the tactic of targeted
killing assessing its role, efficacy, and
appropriateness in the current world
political and military climate. Target
killing is just one available option to
national governments in their varied
arsenals of state-sponsored
strategies and tactics for fighting
terrorism. Nevertheless, it is one of
the most controversial and logistically
dangerous options a government can
exercise in preemptive strikes against
real and current threats to national
security. Author Hunter skillfully
maneuvers through the moral,
military, political, and tactical issues
that can both cloud and clarify a
government’s implementation of state-
sponsored targeted killing. Written
with an expert and precise
understanding of the issue, Targeted
Killing offers an objective and
indispensable perspective on a
contentious and timely debate.
Targeted Killing:
Self-Defense, Preemption,
and the War on Terrorism
Self-Defense, Preemption,
and the War on Terrorism
| by Thomas B. Hunter |
